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ABSTRACT
The term “precession of simulacra”1—coined by French philosopher
Jean Baudrillard to describe the postmodern phenomenon wherein “images 
precede reality”—accurately describes what is wrong with the pre-abortion 
ultrasound mandates that have recently been enacted in a number of
states.2  The term captures the idea that the traditional reality–image hierarchy 
has been inverted and repeatedly re-inverted to the point where the 
boundary between the two has become blurred.  Laws that require doctors 
to display and describe sonograms prior to performing abortions exploit 
this blurring by encouraging women seeking abortions to experience fetal 
images more vividly than they experience the realities that lead them to 
their abortion decisions. Such laws are, when considered in context with
other abortion regulations, quite transparent attempts to characterize fetuses
as persons” and women seeking abortions as their “mothers,” at a time
when the women have already considered and rejected those labels as
inconsistent with their own lived experience.  While it is questionable 
whether such laws actually prevent many abortions, it is clear that the intent 
behind the laws—and in some cases their effect—is to impose guilt and 
shame on a highly vulnerable population.
This Article explains how an ultrasound alters the experience of pregnancy,
how ultrasound mandates operate as pro-life initiatives, and how women
and their doctors can challenge these mandates.  It argues that, although 
the most successful challenges to date have rested on free speech grounds, 
courts ought to invalidate ultrasound mandates on the basis that they
deprive women of “equal dignity” under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
After sketching this legal framework, the Article draws on postmodern
theory to make both descriptive and normative claims: Descriptively, it 
claims that ultrasound mandates represent a “precession of simulacra” in 
that they attempt to render fetal images prior to women’s own realities.
 1. See generally JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION (Sheila Faria
Glaser trans., Univ. of Mich. Press 1994) (1981); Jean Baudrillard, The Evil Demon of Images
and the Precession of Simulacra, in POSTMODERNISM 194 (Thomas Docherty ed., 1993) 
[hereinafter Baudrillard, The Evil Demon of Images].  Jean Baudrillard lived from 1929 to 2007. 
2. Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/ 
state-policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound [https://perma.cc/6G6V-DBN4] (last updated Jan. 
1, 2017) (noting that 25 states regulate the provision of ultrasound by abortion providers). 
118
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Normatively, it claims that ultrasound mandates ought to be abolished
because our laws should not propel us into the state Baudrillard called
“hyperreality,” in which the distinction between the simulated and the real 
is irreparably lost.3 
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, we have thought of reality as prior to images, and images 
as merely reflective of reality.  Yet in our postmodern era, the reality– 
image hierarchy has been inverted and repeatedly re-inverted to the point
where the two categories have actually become blurred. It can, as any 
social media user knows, sometimes be difficult to identify the boundary
between the real and the simulated or imagined.  According to French
philosopher Jean Baudrillard, images in postmodernity have “become more 
real than the real.”4  They have even, he wrote, become “murderers of the real.”5 
To describe this phenomenon of images preceding reality, Baudrillard coined the
phrase “precession of simulacra.”6 Pro-life politicians in several states have
recently capitalized on this postmodern tendency to elevate fetal images— 
and the “personhood” those images symbolize—above reality by enacting
pre-abortion ultrasound mandates. 
While the specifics vary, most of the mandates require doctors not only
to perform ultrasound examinations, but also to offer their patients the
opportunity to view the images.7 These are known as “offer-of-opportunity 
mandates.” Some, however, go further and require doctors to display and
describe the images and, in some cases, make audible the fetal heartbeat.8 
These are known as “display-and-describe mandates.”  While a few have 
been invalidated, most remain in place.9  These mandates effectively exploit 
the “precession of simulacra” by creating a situation in which images precede, 
and perhaps even supersede, women’s own realities.10 They render fetuses
 3. BAUDRILLARD, supra note 1, at 1–3. 
4. See Baudrillard, The Evil Demon of Images, supra note 1, at 195 (positing that “images 
become more real than the real”).
5. Id. at 196. 
6. BAUDRILLARD, supra note 1, at 1.
 7. See Clare Huntington, Familial Norms and Normality, 59 EMORY L.J. 1103,
1133–34 (2010) (footnote omitted).
8. Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 2.
 9. Id. 
10. See Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path
to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 377 (2008) (arguing that mandatory
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“children” and pregnant women their “mothers,” at a time when the women
have already considered and rejected those labels as inconsistent with their 
own lived experience.11 They, in sum, privilege the imagined “personhood” 
of the fetus over the pregnant woman’s reality. 
This Article argues against such mandates.  Part II explains how an 
ultrasound alters the experience of pregnancy, how ultrasound mandates 
operate as pro-life initiatives, and how women and their doctors can
challenge—and have challenged—these mandates.  It argues that the ideal 
legal ground for invalidating such mandates is that they violate the right 
of “equal dignity” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.12  Part III explores 
the complex relationship between images and reality by examining 
Baudrillard’s theory of “precession of simulacra,” and then applying it to 
the specific example of mandatory ultrasounds.  It asserts that the clear intent, 
if not always the effect, of mandatory ultrasounds is to elevate fetal images 
over women’s realities, in hopes that women will forgo abortions or 
experience deep shame and guilt.  Part IV concludes by making the broader
claim that ours laws should not propel us into the state Baudrillard called 
“hyperreality,” in which the reality–image distinction is irreparably lost. 
II. ULTRASOUND AND THE LAW
Part II explains how ultrasound alters the experience of pregnancy, how 
ultrasound mandates operate as pro-life initiatives, and how women and
their doctors can challenge—and have challenged—these mandates. 
More specifically, Part II.A shows that an ultrasound alters the experience 
of pregnancy by personifying the fetus and thereby blurring the line 
between the image of a “child” and the reality of a pregnant woman whose 
lived experience has led her to choose abortion.  Part II.B shows that ultrasound
mandates further pro-life goals by undermining informed consent and 
attempting to manipulate decision-making by evoking guilt and shame in
women seeking abortion.  Part II.C shows that plaintiffs can challenge 
ultrasound mandates based on various constitutional provisions including 
the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Free Speech Clauses, and argues
that more weight ought to be given to “equal dignity” arguments arising
from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.13  Part
ultrasound laws “establish . . .  the state’s position that the fetus is not just ‘potential life’”
and “inform[] women not just about the life of a fetus, but more specifically about the life 
of her fetus” (footnotes omitted)). 
11. Huntington, supra note 7, at 1135–36 (“The laws contribute to the creation of a 
social norm that a fetus is a human being, that pregnant women are mothers who must
conform to maternal norms, and that having an abortion is a shameful act.”).
12.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584, 2589–90, 2608 (2015). 
13. Id.
120
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II concludes by examining two actual challenges, one in which the Fifth
Circuit upheld Texas’s display-and-describe mandate, and one in which
the Fourth Circuit invalidated North Carolina’s display-and-describe 
mandate.  These challenges illustrate the intense—and, this Article argues,
misguided —focus on free speech arguments. 
A. Ultrasound and the Experience of Pregnancy 
The first ultrasound images of fetuses were produced in the 1950s.14  By
the 1980s, it was common for women in the United States to undergo at 
least one ultrasound examination during pregnancy.15 Today, it is common
for women to undergo multiple examinations,16 which unquestionably 
afford many important medical benefits.  They enable doctors to estimate
gestational age, detect potential abnormalities,17 and measure amniotic
fluid indices.18 The use of ultrasound has, on the whole, significantly decreased 
perinatal mortality rates.19  Yet, it is worth noting that most abortions occur
during the first trimester,20 when “routine ultrasound is not considered
medically necessary.”21 
Where there is no medical necessity, this Article argues that individual 
doctors, rather than legislatures, should decide whether to perform ultrasound
examinations.  And when an individual doctor decides to perform an
examination, this Article argues that individual patients, rather than 
legislatures, should decide whether to view the images. While it is undisputed 
that many important medical benefits flow from doctors viewing ultrasound
images, it is unclear what benefits flow from pregnant women—particularly
those seeking abortions—viewing those same images.
14. Margaret B. McNay & John E. E. Fleming, Forty Years of Obstetric Ultrasound 
1957-1997: From A-Scope to Three Dimensions, 25 ULTRASOUND MED. & BIOLOGY 3, 12 
(1999).
15. Sanger, supra note 10, at 366. 
16. Id.
17.  McNay & Fleming, supra note 14, at 34. 
18. Ultrasound Exams, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (Sept. 2013),
http://www.acog.org/-/media/For-Patients/faq025.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20161114T2118479872 
[https:// perma.cc/U7BN-TANU]. 
19.  McNay & Fleming, supra note 14, at 27. 
20. Fact Sheet: Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2017),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/Factsheet/fb_induced_abortion_1.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/TQZ5-MHRB] (noting that in 2013, eighty-nine percent of abortions occurred in
the first twelve weeks).
21. Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 2.
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Indeed, one study suggests that viewing ultrasound images rarely alters 
a woman’s abortion decision,22 though it may inspire a variety of emotions
and—the study’s authors suggest—affect the patient’s “sense of autonomy.”23 
The study “analyzed medical records from over 15,000 abortion visits
during 2011” to a provider with “a policy of offering every patient the 
voluntary opportunity to view her ultrasound image.”24  It found that “[o]ver 
42% of incoming abortion patients chose to view their ultrasound images, 
and the substantial majority (99%) of all 15,000 pregnancies ended in 
abortion.”25  It further found the following: 
As it turns out, seeing the ultrasound images as such does little to change women’s
minds about abortion. What matters is how women scheduled for abortions
already feel. Viewing an ultrasound can matter for women who are not fully certain 
about their plans to have an abortion. . . . [A]mong the small fraction (7.4%) of
women who were not very certain or only moderately certain, viewing slightly increased
the odds that they would forego their planned abortion and continue with their
pregnancy. Nonetheless, this effect was very small and most did proceed to abortion.26 
While the study does not answer every question, inasmuch as it examined
a provider where ultrasounds were optional rather than mandatory, it does 
call into question—in one author’s words—“the wisdom of state laws that
force women scheduled to have abortions” to undergo pre-abortion
ultrasounds.27  Because abortion providers already offer patients the 
opportunity to view ultrasound images, and because most do not want to
view those images, mandates are inappropriate.28 
In obstetrics practice outside of the abortion context, ultrasounds have 
long been thought to promote prenatal bonding between the pregnant 
woman and the fetus.29  Some doctors believe that the ability of a pregnant 
woman to “visualise motion, breathing[, and] activity . . . bring[s] reassurance,”30 
and encourages lifestyle alterations that are beneficial to the fetus—such
as quitting smoking.31  Indeed, some pregnant women seek out “prenatal
 22. Katrina Kimport, Does Viewing Ultrasounds Affect Abortion Decisions?, JOURNALIST’S 
RESOURCE, http://journalistsresource.org/studies/society/public-health/does-viewing-ultrasounds­





 26. Id. 
27. Id.
 28. See id.
 29. Sanger, supra note 10, at 365–66; Ingrid Zechmeister, Foetal Images: The Power 
of Visual Technology in Antenatal Care and the Implications for Women’s Reproductive 
Freedom, 9 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 387, 389 (2001). 
30.  McNay & Fleming, supra note 14, at 39. 
31. Zechmeister, supra note 29, at 389. 
122
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portrait studios” that will, for a fee, produce ultrasound images for entirely 
non-medical purposes.32  While viewing ultrasound images is, for some
women, a happy and highly positive experience, it is a negative experience 
for others.33  This can be true in the context of a wanted or unwanted
pregnancy.  In a wanted pregnancy, an ultrasound examination may reveal 
a serious anomaly.34  In an unwanted pregnancy, an ultrasound examination
may create a perceived “confrontation” between the woman and fetus.35 
Professor Carol Sanger emphasizes that, in reality, this confrontation is 
one-sided, in that “the fetus does not actually stare back” at the pregnant 
woman.36  Yet, she observes, “ultrasound technicians routinely attribute
responsive intentional behavior” to the fetus—for example, describing it 
as waving hello.37  Ultrasound examinations can, in sum, have powerful
impacts on pregnant women.  Even if they do not produce the intended guilt
and shame, they may well diminish a patient’s “sense of autonomy.”38 
As scholars have observed, the use of ultrasound technology can
symbolically invert the woman–fetus hierarchy.39  Prior to the advent of
ultrasound technology, the woman was, at least visually, prior to the fetus.
Pregnancy became “real” by virtue of the woman feeling, rather than a
doctor seeing, the fetus.40 Since the advent of ultrasound technology, 
however, the fetus has preceded the woman, at least visually—and perhaps 
otherwise. Professor Ingrid Zechmeister, an expert in health policy, argues 
that through ultrasound, the fetus “becomes the important object [and] the 
mother herself becomes less important.”41  She continues, “scientific 
32. Associated Press, FDA Warns Against Prenatal Portrait Studios, NBC NEWS
(Mar. 31, 2004, 7:48 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4609938/ns/health-womens_health/t/fda-
warns-against-prenatal-portrait-studios/#.Vaa01OGGMg4 [https://perma.cc/TL8F-NXNE]. 
33. Sanger, supra note 15, at 359.  But see Kimport, supra note 22. The study found
“no evidence that viewing was broadly distressing.”  Id. Kimport, one of the authors, 
writes, “[j]ust over one in five [women] reported that viewing provoked negative reactions 
of guilt, depression, or sadness; 1 in 10 reported positive feelings such as happiness; and
the largest group, just over a third, said they felt ‘fine,’ ‘okay,’ or even ‘nothing.’” Id. Yet
Kimport, as previously noted, warns that “[f]orcing women to view their ultrasounds 
could . . . affect [their] sense of autonomy.”  Id. 




 38. Kimport, supra note 22. 
39. Zechmeister, supra note 29, at 393. 
40. Sanger, supra note 15, at 355 (“Historically, the event that converted pregnancy 
into something real was quickening, fetal movement felt by the mother.”).
41. Zechmeister, supra note 29, at 391. 
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photographs of the foetus . . . make the mother invisible[, thereby] bestowing a
status of independence upon the foetus.”42  While ultrasound images 
unquestionably convey valuable medical information about the fetus, they
convey little information about the fetus’s relationship to the pregnant 
43woman.
This shift in focus from woman to fetus mirrors a broader shift in focus 
from the reality of the woman’s circumstances—her health status, her 
family dynamics, her financial situation, her existing responsibilities, her 
educational and career goals, and her hopes and dreams—to the imagined
status of the fetus as a “person” or “human being.”44  Women’s lived
experiences are dismissed as irrelevant when ultrasound technicians are 
required by law to describe fetuses as “whole, separate, unique, living 
human being[s].”45  Their realities are, in Baudrillard’s terminology, being—at
least momentarily—preceded by ultrasound images.46 And this precession is
exacerbated as technology advances and ultrasound images become clearer 
and more detailed with 3D and even 4D imaging.47  While some women
may retain their pre-existing attitude toward the fetus after viewing the 
images and listening to the legally mandated descriptions, others may come
to believe that that the images on the screen are more real, and more important,
than their own lived experience.  All will presumably understand that their 
government believes the latter to be true.
B. Mandatory Ultrasounds and the Pro-Life Movement 
If mandatory ultrasounds, as Part II.A suggests, diminish women’s 
sense of autonomy, they effectively undermine informed consent.  While
proponents of mandatory ultrasounds portray them as enhancing informed
consent, Part II.B illustrates that, in reality, they do just the opposite. 
Rather than empowering patients by giving them the information necessary
to make a fully informed and autonomous decision, mandatory ultrasounds 
attempt to manipulate patients in already-vulnerable positions to either 
carry their pregnancies to term or live with deep guilt and shame.
 42. Id.
 43. Id.
 44. See, e.g., Kathy Seward Northern, Procreative Torts: Enhancing the Common 
Law Protection for Procreative Autonomy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 523 (describing some
of the circumstances that might be relevant to a woman’s abortion decision). 
45. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6709(b)(5), 65-6710 (West 2016). 
46. See, e.g., Zechmeister, supra note 29, at 392 (“[I]n contrast to the ‘true’ information
on the screen, the mother’s feelings are often regarded as of little importan[ce].”).
47. Id. at 393; see also R. Morgan Griffin, 3D and 4D Ultrasounds, WEB MD,
http://www.webmd.com/baby/guide/3d-4d-ultrasound [https://perma.cc/KWE6-SCE9] (last
reviewed May 22, 2016). 
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States have long required that, prior to providing treatment, doctors 
must give their patients the information necessary for informed consent.48 
The primary goal of informed consent is patient autonomy.49  Historically, 
doctors have determined on their own what information is necessary to 
ensure informed consent, and allegations of incorrect determinations have 
been judged against either “professional standards” developed within the
medical community or “prudent patient” standards, depending on the 
jurisdiction.50  In the unique context of abortion, however, some states have 
mandated the delivery of highly specific—often pro-life leaning51— 
information.52  This information can take the form of specific written 
materials that must be provided,53 specific words that must be uttered,54 or— 
our present focus—specific images that must be displayed and described.55 
While the Supreme Court in some early cases invalidated abortion-
specific informed consent requirements,56 its 1992 decision of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey upheld Pennsylvania’s mandate that doctors offer 
women seeking abortions state-produced written materials—even though
 48. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125 (1914) (“Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done 
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent
commits an assault for which he is liable in damages.”).
49. Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-
Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 226, 235, 240 (2009). 
50. See, e.g., Northern, supra note 44, at 512–16.
51. Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 
89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 998 (2009) (noting that “most state-mandated information espouses 
a pro-life point of view”). 
52. See id. at 998–1000 (arguing that the information required under these statutes 
does “invariably above and beyond standard informed consent”). 
53. Pennsylvania’s statute, discussed below in conjunction with Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, provides an example. See 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3205, 3209 (West
2016); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833 (1992). 
54. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2016) (requiring that patients be
informed that the procedure “will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being,” with whom they have “an existing relationship”), upheld in Planned
Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 2011), vacated in part on rehearing
en banc sub nom. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011) 
and on rehearing en banc sub nom. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 
(8th Cir. 2012). 
55. Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 2.
 56. Manian, supra note 49, at 244–47 (discussing Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians 
& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 
462 U.S. 416 (1983)). 
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the materials espoused a pro-life viewpoint.57  Justice O’Connor wrote for 
a plurality that “a state [may] protect[] the life of the unborn by enacting 
legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even
when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over
abortion.”58  She continued, “[R]equiring that the woman be informed of
the availability of information relating to fetal development and the 
assistance available should she decide to carry the pregnancy to full term
is a reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice, one which might 
cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”59 
As Professor Maya Manian observes in discussing this aspect of Casey, 
“Obviously, patients cannot be self-determining if given information biased
towards one outcome.”60  Professor Manian’s work illustrates that current 
abortion doctrine “ignores the long history of protection for patient
decision-making capacity that has been well-established in informed consent 
law.”61  Building upon Professor Manian’s work, Part II.B argues that
display-and-describe statutes are at least as inconsistent with the primary goal
of informed consent—promoting patient autonomy—as requiring doctors 
to inform patients of the availability of state-produced written materials.62 
Forcing women seeking abortions to view ultrasound images and listen to 
doctors recite detailed descriptions of their fetuses denies the realities that 
motivated their abortion decisions and, ultimately, provides evidence of a 
strong pro-life bias. 
While ultrasound mandates may not seem inherently pro-life, and while 
their proponents may portray them as ensuring informed consent, a careful
examination of the statutory context in which they operate belies any
suggestion that they are neutral or impartial.  First, ultrasound mandates 
often refer to the embryo or fetus as an “unborn child.”63  Some assert that 
“personhood begins at conception,”64 and one requires that women be 
informed that the abortion procedure “will terminate the life of a whole, 
separate, unique, living human being[.]”65  Others require that doctors give
 57. Id. at 249 (discussing Casey, 505 U.S. 833). 
58. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883; see Manian, supra note 49, at 250. 
59. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883. 
60. Manian, supra note 49, at 250. 
61. Id. at 242. 
62. Id. at 240. 
63. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(D)(2)(a) (2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.15
(West 2016).
64. Indiana, Kansas, and Texas are in this category. Counseling and Waiting Periods 
for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling- 
and-waiting-periods-abortion [https://perma.cc/64HM-BRSZ] (last updated Jan. 1, 2017). 
65. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6709(b)(5), 65-6710 (West 2016). 
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women access to information about fetal pain,66 risks to future fertility,67 
connections between abortion and breast cancer,68 and data about mental
health outcomes69—even though each of these four categories of information 
are contested.  All these aspects of the law work together in an effort to 
manipulate women’s decisions.70  Yet the unique power of images makes 
mandatory ultrasounds one of the most powerful pro-life tactics. Indeed, 
at least one state—North Carolina—openly admits that the “purpose of [its
ultrasound mandate] is to support the state’s pro-life position.”71 
Ultrasound mandates take a variety of forms.  At present, twenty-five 
states regulate the use of ultrasound in the context of abortion.72  Thirteen 
of those twenty-five expressly mandate ultrasounds, while the rest give
either the provider or the pregnant woman some discretion to decide 
whether an ultrasound will be performed.73 Nine of the thirteen that expressly 
mandate ultrasounds require that the provider “offer the woman the
opportunity to view the image,”74 three require that the provider “show and 
describe the image,”75 and one—Oklahoma—has no requirements beyond 
the performance of the examination.76  This is because Oklahoma, along 
with North Carolina, had a display-and-describe requirement that has been
 66. See, e.g., OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.8 (West 2016); Hannah Stahle, Comment, 
Fetal Pain Legislation: An Undue Burden, 10 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 251, 255 (2007). 
67. Texas, for example, requires that women be given information that the Guttmacher
Institute believes “inaccurately portrays [the] risk” to future fertility.  Counseling and Waiting
Periods for Abortion, supra note 64. 
68. Kansas and Texas, for example, require that physicians give women information 
that the Guttmacher Institute believes “inaccurately asserts [a] possible link” between abortion
and breast cancer.  Id.
69. Kansas, Louisiana, and North Carolina, for example, require that physicians 
give women information that the Guttmacher Institute believes focuses too heavily on the 
“negative emotional responses” without fully describing the full “range of emotional
responses.” Id. 
70. See Sanger, supra note 10. 
71.  Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 246 (2014). 
72. Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 2.
 73. Id.  Of those that do not expressly mandate ultrasounds, some require the provider 
to offer an ultrasound, and others require that, if the provider decides to perform an
ultrasound, the woman must be offered an opportunity to view the image. 
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id.
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permanently enjoined.77  The remainder of this section will provide an 
overview of both offer-of-opportunity and display-and-describe requirements. 
Offer-of-opportunity requirements are in place in Alabama, Arizona, 
Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, and Virginia.78 
While there are variations with respect to their specifics—for example,
timing requirements79—Indiana’s statute, which is currently being challenged,80 
represents a fairly typical example of an offer-of-opportunity requirement. 
It begins by stating that, barring a medical emergency, a woman seeking 
an abortion must give informed consent.81 While this is unremarkable because
a patient must give informed consent prior to any medical procedure, the 
statute goes on to enumerate the specific information required to constitute 
informed consent.  This includes, among other things, the pregnant woman’s 
written certification that she “has been offered by the provider the opportunity 
to view the fetal ultrasound imaging and hear the auscultation of the fetal 
heart tone if the fetal heart tone is audible[.]”82  Notably, the provider must 
also inform the woman that “human physical life begins when a human
ovum is fertilized by a human sperm” and that the fetus can feel pain, even 
before twenty weeks gestational age.83  Taken as a whole, the statute is calculated
to encourage childbirth over abortion.  While Casey, as previously discussed, 
allows states to promote pro-life opinions in certain contexts,84 this 
manipulation of patient decision-making is inconsistent with traditional 
principles of informed consent. 
Display-and-describe requirements are in place in Louisiana, Texas,
and Wisconsin,85 and were previously in place in North Carolina and 
77. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85 (2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d
(West 2016); Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 607 (M.D.N.C 2014) (holding North 
Carolina ultrasound requirement unconstitutional); Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, 233
P.3d 380, 382 (Okla. 2010) (enjoining Oklahoma ultrasound requirement). 
78. Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 2.
 79. Id.
80. Michelle D. Anderson, ACLU of Indiana Sues State Health Department, County 
Prosecutors over Ultrasound Law, REWIRE (July 8, 2016, 6:12 PM), https://rewire.news/ 
article/2016/07/08/aclu-indiana-sues-state-health-department-county-prosecutors-ultrasound­
law/ [https://perma.cc/CPG6-3HZG].
81. IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1(a) (2016). 
82. Id. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(3)(B). 
83. IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(E)–(G). 
84.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833 (1992). 
85. Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 2.
These three states offer limited exceptions to their requirements. Id.  All three allow the
woman to “look away from the image” and, in certain situations, Louisiana and Texas
allow her to opt out of the description.  Id.  Wisconsin waives the ultrasound requirement 
for women who have been sexually assaulted. Id. 
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Oklahoma.86  All five of these statutes, of course, require abortion providers
to display and describe ultrasound images prior to performing abortions,87 
though they generally contain exceptions for emergency situations.88 
Four of them leave the specifics of the “display” requirement within the 
patient’s or provider’s discretion,89 while one—Oklahoma’s now defunct
statute—directs the provider to use whatever transducer will produce the 
clearest image, whether it be vaginal or abdominal.90 All implement the
“describe” requirement through language resembling the following—drawn 
from Louisiana’s statute: The provider must give “a simultaneous and
objectively accurate oral explanation of what the ultrasound is depicting, 
in a manner understandable to a layperson, which shall include the
presence and location of the unborn child within the uterus and the number
of unborn children depicted.”91  Louisiana’s statute lifts this requirement
in cases where the woman certifies that the pregnancy is the result of rape
or incest,92 and other states offer similar—but not identical—exceptions.93 
All five display-and-describe statutes proceed, perhaps surprisingly, by
stating that the woman need not actually view the images.94  Louisiana’s 
86. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85 (2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d
(West 2016); Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585 (M.D.N.C 2014) (holding North
Carolina requirement unconstitutional); Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, 233 P.3d 380, 
382 (Okla. 2010) (enjoining Oklahoma requirement). 
87. Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 2; see, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 
40:1061.10(D)(2)(a)–(b) (West 2016). 
88. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(D) (West 2016) (providing an exemption for 
medical emergencies); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1­
738.3d(D) (providing an exemption for medical emergencies); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE  ANN. § 171.0124 (West 2016) (“A physician may perform an abortion without 
obtaining informed consent under this subchapter in a medical emergency.”); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 253.10(3)(c) (West 2016).
89. Wisconsin, for example, allows the patient to choose the method. WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 253.10(3g)(a)(1) (West 2016).  Others do not appear to specify.
90. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(B)(1). 
91. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(D)(2)(b)(ii). 
92. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(D)(2)(d)(iv)(3). 
93. Texas, for example, lifts its requirement when the pregnancy is the result of a 
certain type of sexual violation, the woman is a minor proceeding pursuant to a judicial 
bypass statute, or the fetus has an “irreversible medical condition or abnormality.”  TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0122(d). 
94. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(D)(2)(a)(i); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(b) (2016) 
(stating that the woman may refuse to listen to the explanation and may also avert her
eyes); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(C) (West 2016) (stating that, although the
woman must listen to the provider’s explanation, she may “avert[] her eyes” from the 
images); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0122. 
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statute, for example, expressly states that despite the display mandate,
“[n]othing . . . shall be construed to prevent the pregnant woman from 
not . . . viewing the images[.]”95  Thus, while the provider must display the
images, the woman may avert her eyes.  All five display-and-describe statutes 
also require that the provider locate the fetal heartbeat, if possible,96 though 
only Texas absolutely requires that it be made audible.97  Even Texas, 
however, does not require that the woman listen to the heartbeat,98 though 
it is unclear how a woman would entirely avoid listening.  The Fifth
Circuit, in interpreting this provision, stated that a woman’s choice not to
listen “does not obviate the physician’s obligations to . . . make audible 
the heart auscultation,” but noted that “the woman may simply choose not 
to . . . listen.”99 
All but one of the five display-and-describe statutes—Oklahoma’s— 
use the term “child” pervasively,100 which along with other evidence suggests
they share the goal of preventing abortion.  The Wisconsin statute expressly 
says it is intended to further the state’s interest in, among other things, 
“protecting . . . the life of [the] unborn child.”101 The Texas statute requires
the provider to give the woman information on the services “available to 
assist [her] through pregnancy, childbirth, and the child’s dependency[.]”102 
The Louisiana statute contains a provision that—although impacted by an 
agreement between the law’s challengers and state officials103—requires 
the provider to offer the woman “the option of requesting an ultrasound
photograph or print of her unborn child.”104  The North Carolina statute, 
as previously mentioned, quite openly “promote[s] a pro-life message,” in 
the Fourth Circuit’s words, “by demanding the provision of facts that all 
95. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(D)(2)(a)(i).
96. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.82(1)(e) (2016) (requiring that the provider 
requires that the provider offer the woman “the opportunity to hear the fetal heart tone”);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(B)(4) (West 2016); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 171.012(a)(4). 
97. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4). 
98. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0122(c). 
99. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 583 
(5th Cir. 2012). 
100. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1061.10(D)(2)(a)(ii)–(iii) (2016); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(1) (2016); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 253.10 (3g)(a)(2) (West 2016).
101. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(1)(b)(1). 
102. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a).
103.  Press Release, Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Parts of Louisiana Abortion Ultrasound 
Law Blocked (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.reproductiverights.org/press-room/parts-of­
louisiana-abortion-ultrasound-law-blocked [https://perma.cc/CS7W-ZDPP] [hereinafter
Ctr. for Reprod. Rights]. 
104. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1061.10 (D)(2)(a)(iii). 
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fall on one side of the abortion debate[.]”105  Rather than furthering patient
autonomy and ensuring informed consent, these statutes deny women’s 
realities and—when they function as intended—guilt them into continuing 
their pregnancies. They are, in sum, pro-life laws.
C. Challenges to Mandatory Ultrasounds 
Some of the ultrasound mandates discussed in Part II.B have been challenged 
as violating the federal Constitution, and a few have been invalidated. 
Louisiana’s display-and-describe statute remains in place, after a challenge 
was dropped following an agreement with state officials to stop enforcing 
certain provisions.106  Texas’s display-and-describe statute remains in 
place after the Fifth Circuit reversed a successful challenge at the federal
district court level.107 Wisconsin’s display-and-describe statute has not been
challenged, but given that other parts of the state’s abortion law have been 
judicially invalidated, additional litigation seems likely.108  North Carolina’s
display-and-describe statute is not being enforced: It was invalidated by
the Fourth Circuit as compelling physician speech in violation of the First
Amendment, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.109  Finally, Oklahoma’s
display-and-describe statute is also not being enforced: It was invalidated
in a very brief opinion by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, citing Casey and 
the Federal Supremacy Clause.110 
Part II.C will illustrate that ultrasound mandates have typically been 
attacked as burdening three sets of rights—those protected by the Due
Process, Equal Protection, and Free Speech Clauses.  Free speech claims
have been by far the most successful, yet other claims may be available:
One commentator has argued that ultrasound mandates violate the Fourth 
105. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2014). 
106. Complaint, Hope Med. Grp. for Women v. Caldwell, 2010 WL 3269282 (M.D. 
La. 2010) (3:10-CV-00511); Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, supra note 103. 
107. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 584 
(5th Cir. 2012). 
108. Glenn Kessler, Walker’s Claim that a Controversial Abortion Law Allows a Choice 
of Ultrasounds, WASH. POST (June 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact­
checker/wp/2015/06/05/walkers-claim-that-a-controversial-abortion-law-allows-a-choice-of- 
ultrasounds/ [https://perma.cc/3UL6-BFSR].
109. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 250, cert. denied sub nom. Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 
S. Ct. 2838, 2838 (2015). 
110.  Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28, 28 (Okla. 2012). 
 131







    
 
  




















Amendment right against searches and seizures,111 and this Article will
suggest that challengers ought to focus on the Fourteenth Amendment 
right of “equal dignity.”  Specifically, Part II.C.1, after explaining how the 
typical due process, equal protection, and free speech challenges operate,
will sketch an alternative “equal dignity” approach that would more fully 
comprehend the harms inflicted by these statutes.  Part II.C.2 will examine 
two actual cases—those litigated in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits—for
purposes of showing the intense—and, this Article argues, misguided— 
focus on free speech claims. 
1. Potential Challenges 
a. Mandatory Ultrasounds Violate Due Process Rights 
First, mandatory ultrasound statutes violate the Due Process Clause,
which provides that no state shall “deprive any person of liberty . . . without
due process of law.”112  The clause has long been read as securing certain 
rights to make decisions about procreation.113  The Supreme Court held,
in the 1972 decision of Eisenstadt v. Baird, that “liberty” includes the right 
to decide “whether to bear or beget a child.”114  The right to abortion was, 
of course, most strongly recognized in the 1973 decision of Roe v. Wade.115 
Although this right has been diluted by subsequent decisions including
Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 1992, Stenberg v. Carhart in 2000, and 
Gonzales v. Carhart in 2007,116 it persists at least to the extent necessary 
to invalidate ultrasound mandates.  Indeed, the Court’s most recent abortion
decision, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, reaffirmed the pre-viability
standards originally set forth in Casey’s plurality opinion: Before viability, 
the government may not impose an undue burden—meaning it must not pass
 111. See Note, Physically Intrusive Abortion Restrictions as Fourth Amendment Searches 
and Seizures, 128 HARV. L. REV. 951 (2015). 
112. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
113.  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
114. Id. (recognizing the right in dicta, while invalidating Massachusetts’s ban on
the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals as violating the Equal Protection 
Clause).  This statement was more recently reiterated in Lawrence v. Texas. 539 U.S. 558, 
565 (2003) (invalidating Texas’s same-sex sodomy law as violating the Due Process Clause). 
115.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). 
116. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992) (upholding a
mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting period, requiring the physician to “inform the woman
of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the 
‘probable gestational age of the unborn child,’” and requiring the woman to certify that 
she has been informed of certain materials provided by the state); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914, 939 (2000) (invalidating a Nebraska law criminalizing partial birth abortions 
because the language was so broad that it applied to multiple procedures); Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (upholding the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act). 
132
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a law with the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle—in a 
woman’s path to abortion.117  While the Hellerstedt Court did not address 
the post-viability standard set forth in Casey and its progeny, that standard 
has remained largely unchanged since Roe: After viability, the government
may ban abortion, so long as it provides exceptions to protect the woman’s 
life and health.118 
Focusing on the pre-viability portion of the standard, because the vast
majority of abortions occur before viability, one could argue that ultrasound
mandates have the purpose—and perhaps even the effect—of placing a 
substantial obstacle in a woman’s path to abortion, and should therefore 
be invalidated. That their purpose is to impose a substantial obstacle is
apparent from the discussion in Part II.B, which reveals their pro-life intentions.
That their effect is to impose a substantial obstacle is less clear, and 
depends on how effect is measured.  While the study described in Part II.B
suggests that viewing ultrasound images rarely alters a woman’s ultimate 
decision,119 ultrasound mandates may still operate as substantial obstacles,
inasmuch as they express government disapproval of women who seek 
abortions and attempt to evoke feelings of guilt and shame.  Women must 
overcome these substantial obstacles to proceed with the procedure.
Ultimately, however, showing that a given mandate’s purpose is to impose 
a substantial obstacle to pre-viability abortion will suffice under the plurality
opinion in Casey and the majority opinion in Hellerstedt.120 
b. Mandatory Ultrasounds Violate Equal Protection Rights 
Second, mandatory ultrasound statutes violate the Equal Protection
Clause, which provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”121  The Court, in its 1976 
decision of Craig v. Boren, held that statutes discriminating based on sex
are subject to intermediate scrutiny and must be “substantially” related to
 117. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877; Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 
2300 (2016).
118. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64; Casey, 505 U.S. at 879. While Gonzales called the
health-exception requirement into question by upholding a federal “partial birth abortion” 
ban without a health exception, the Court did not believe the procedure in question would 
ever fall within that exception. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 125.
 119. Kimport, supra note 22. 
120. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877; Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300. 
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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achieving “important” government interests.122 It held elsewhere, including 
in its 1996 decision of United States v. Virginia, that preserving sex stereotypes 
does not constitute an “important” government interest.123  Justice Ginsburg, 
writing for the Court in United States v. Virginia, stated, “[G]eneralizations
about ‘the way women are,’ estimates of what is appropriate for most women,
no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity
place them outside the average description.”124  Mandatory ultrasound statutes
rest at least in part on sex stereotypes, including the stereotypes that women
should be mothers and that women are incapable of making their own 
medical decisions.125 
Yet statutes only trigger intermediate scrutiny if there is actually sex
discrimination, and some would argue that mandatory ultrasound statutes 
do not engage in sex discrimination.  They do not, after all, target all women—
only those who are pregnant and seeking abortions.  And under decisions 
like Geduldig v. Aiello in 1974, there may not be any sex discrimination 
where a law disadvantages only some women.126  In Geduldig, the Court 
upheld a disability insurance system that excluded coverage for disabilities 
arising from normal pregnancy, essentially saying that because neither 
men nor women received coverage for pregnancy-related disabilities, there 
was no sex discrimination.127  Accordingly, the Court applied rational basis 
review and found the statute rationally related to the state’s legitimate
economic interests.128  Yet even under such a relaxed standard as rational 
basis review, the fate of mandatory ultrasound statutes would be uncertain. 
While states would claim interests in protecting fetal life and ensuring 
informed consent, challengers might respond that the statute is not rationally
related to achieving those interests.  In terms of protecting fetal life, they
could cite the above-discussed study showing that viewing ultrasounds 
has a minimal impact on women’s abortion decisions.129  In terms of ensuring 
informed consent, they could argue that ultrasound mandates do just the 
122.  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
123.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534, 549 (1996). 
124. Id. at 550. 
125. Plaintiffs made these arguments in Lakey. Amended Class Action Complaint
at 37, Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942
(W.D. Tex. 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-00486-SS), http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civic
actions.net/files/documents/TMP%20Amended%20Class%20Action%20Complaint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/57VA-AVX8]; see also Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion:
An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 
1047–50. 
126.  Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974). 
127. Id.
 128. Id.
 129. Kimport, supra note 22. 
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opposite: They are designed to encourage a particular choice, rather than
to enable informed and autonomous self-determination.130 
Yet it is also possible that Geduldig is not as significant an impediment
to sex discrimination claims as some would argue.  Professor Reva Siegel 
has explained that some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have read
Geduldig as limited by the Court’s 2003 decision in Nevada Department 
of Human Resources v. Hibbs.131  The Hibbs Court, Professor Siegel writes,
held that when pregnancy leaves “provide new mothers more time off than 
is physically needed to recover from giving birth,” they “violate[] equal 
protection [by] discriminat[ing] between the sexes in ways that perpetuate 
sex stereotypes concerning the different roles and responsibilities of
fathers and mothers.”132  The Ninth Circuit in 2004 wrote, “Hibbs strongly
supports [the] argument that singling out abortion in ways unrelated to the 
facts distinguishing abortion from other medical procedures is an
unconstitutional form of discrimination on the basis of gender.”133  Based 
on the discussion in Part II.B, it is clear that mandatory ultrasound statutes 
single out abortion by setting forth the exact actions required for informed 
consent when this is not done for other medical procedures.134 
While equal protection arguments have not typically been successful in 
challenging mandatory ultrasound statutes, this Article contends that they
ought to be.  As Justice Ginsburg has famously observed, many abortion
regulations can be attacked as sex discrimination.135  She wrote, in dissent 
to the 2007 decision of Gonzales v. Carhart, about the equal protection
dimensions of abortion litigation, emphasizing that limits on abortion 
impact “a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to 
enjoy equal citizenship stature.”136  Only when women possess reproductive
autonomy, in other words, can they truly be “equal citizens.”137  As Professor 
130. See supra Part II.B.
 131. Reva Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights, 56 EMORY L.J.
815, 832–33 (2007) (discussing Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 531 (2003), 
and Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
132. Siegel, supra note 131, at 832. 
133. Id. at 833 (quoting Tucson Woman’s Clinic, 379 F.3d at 548). 
134. See supra Part II.B.
 135. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 385 (1985) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 
356–57 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
136.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 171–72 (2007). 
137. Ginsburg, supra note 135, at 383 (citing Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 57–59 (1977)). 
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Reva Siegel has similarly explained, existing equal protection doctrine does 
“not even remotely sanction” laws that pressure women to “make[] choices 
about continuing a pregnancy that reflect [their] ‘inherent’ or ‘intrinsic’
‘nature as . . . mother[s].’”138  Mandatory ultrasound statutes arguably fall 
within this non-sanctioned category, and courts should require states to defend
them against at least intermediate or “skeptical” scrutiny.
c. Mandatory Ultrasounds Violate Free Speech Rights 
Third, mandatory ultrasound laws violate the Free Speech Clause, which 
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech[.]”139  They do so by requiring doctors—and, some have argued,
pregnant women—to engage in compelled speech.140  The Supreme Court 
has held that the First Amendment protects not only the right to speak, but 
also the right not to speak.141  It stated, in West Virginia v. Barnette, “If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein.”142  It further stated, in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, that the state “may
not compel affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees.”143  It
continued, “‘Since all speech inherently involves choices of what to say 
and what to leave unsaid,’ one important manifestation of the principle of 
free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide ‘what not to
say.’”144 
When statutes require abortion providers to display and describe ultrasound 
images and, in some cases, refer to the fetus as a “child,” they quite clearly
compel doctors to speak.145  Some would additionally argue that, when
 138. Siegel, supra note 125, at 1047. 
139. U.S.CONST.amend. I.  While the Free Speech Clause appears in the First Amendment, 
which applies only to the federal government, it was deemed incorporated against the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in 1925.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652, 666 (1925). 
140. See generally Corbin, supra note 51, at 998–1000 (arguing that mandatory ultrasound 
laws violate a right against compelled listening); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A
First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 979– 
80 (arguing that mandatory ultrasound laws violate a right against compelled speech).
141.  W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943). 
142. Id. at 642. 
143. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 573 
(1995).
144. Id. (citations omitted).
145. Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The
First Amendment’s Limit on Compelled Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 
2383–84 (2013). 
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statutes require women to allow physicians or ultrasound technicians to
use their bodies to produce images, they likewise compel patients to speak.146 
One could cite numerous free speech cases stating that laws compelling 
viewpoint-based—“ideological”—speech ordinarily trigger strict scrutiny.147 
Yet one could also cite the Casey plurality’s statement that “the practice
of medicine[ is] subject to reasonable licensing and regulation,”148 such 
that if a doctor must give a patient information that is “truthful,” 
“nonmisleading,” and “relevant . . . to the decision,” no constitutional infirmity
exists.149 While this disparity creates some uncertainty as to the proper
level of scrutiny, it seems clear, as the Fourth Circuit concluded, that courts 
should review mandatory ultrasound statutes with at least intermediate— 
if not strict—scrutiny.  This Article will discuss the specifics of free speech 
claims further in Part III.C.2, which describes two litigated cases.
Beyond compelled speech arguments, which are quite strong and have 
been the most successful means of attack on mandatory ultrasound 
statutes, Professor Caroline Corbin has argued that the Supreme Court should 
also recognize a right against compelled listening.  This would prevent states
from forcibly exposing women to the legislature’s views on abortion.150 
Professor Corbin suggests that this right against compelled listening flows 
naturally from several lines of cases, including the captive audience cases,
which balance a speaker’s free speech rights against a listener’s privacy 
or equality rights.151  This right, if it exists, clearly conflicts with mandates 
that require women seeking abortions to listen to doctors’ descriptions of
images and to fetal heart tones.  Compelled listening arguments ought to
carry a great deal of weight: Given their patient-focused nature, they comprehend
unique harms that compelled speech arguments do not capture.  And their 
close link with free speech rights makes them especially powerful under 
existing doctrine. 
146. Cheri D. Smith, Mandatory Ultrasound Statutes and the First Amendment,
Shifting the Constitutional Perspective, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 855, 874 (2014). 
147. Content-based regulations of speech generally trigger strict scrutiny. Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); RAV v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 395–96 (1992); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715–16 (1977). 
148.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
149. Id. at 882. 
150. See Corbin, supra note 51, at 1007. 
151. Id. at 951–52 (“The captive audience doctrine has traditionally been based on 
the idea that the government may curtail a speaker’s free speech rights when those rights 
are outweighed by a listener’s privacy rights.”).
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d. Mandatory Ultrasounds Violate the Principle of “Equal Dignity” 
Finally, this Article contends that mandatory ultrasounds violate the
principle of “equal dignity” recognized in a line of cases culminating in
the 2015 decision of Obergefell v. Hodges.152  There, the Court in an opinion 
by Justice Kennedy held same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional.153  The
holding rested on both due process and equal protection grounds, and the
phrase “equal dignity” appears three times in the opinion—twice in reference
to women, and once in reference to gays and lesbians.154 The first reference
to women’s “equal dignity” comes as the Court explains that in the 1800s, 
“society began to understand that women have their own equal dignity
[and thus abandoned] the law of coverture[.]”155  The second reference to
women’s “equal dignity” comes as the Court describes the historical inequality
of women within civil marriage and asserts that sex-based classifications— 
for example, treating husbands as heads of family—“denied the equal 
dignity of men and women.”156 
The Court discusses at length the close relationship between equality
and liberty, describing them as “interlocking . . . constitutional safeguards” 
that are “connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent 
principles.”157  The majority, of course, ultimately concludes that same-sex 
marriage bans both “burden the liberty of same-sex couples” and “abridge 
central precepts of equality.”158  While some have critiqued the Obergefell
opinion as doctrinally flawed,159 others have praised it for helping to develop
the concept of  “equal dignity.”160  Professor Laurence Tribe, for example, 
has described Obergefell’s primary contribution as “[winding] the double 
helix of Due Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal
dignity.”161  Professor Kenji Yoshino has described Obergefell as “a game
changer for substantive due process jurisprudence” because of its new 
focus on “the role antisubordination concerns have played in due process 
152.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
153. Id. at 2585. 
154. Id. at 2585, 2595, 2603, 2608. 
155. Id. at 2595. 
156. Id. at 2603. 
157. Id. at 2590, 2602–03. 
158. Id. at 2590. 
159. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, A Great Decision on Same-Sex Marriage—But Based on 
Dubious Reasoning, WASH. POST (June 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/26/a-great-decision-on-same-sex-marriage-but-based-on­
dubious-reasoning [https://perma.cc/VT8U-59PE]. 
160. Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 17 
(2015); Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 147, 148 (2015). 
161. Tribe, supra note 160. 
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analysis[.]”162  As Professor Yoshino has suggested, this aspect of Obergefell
could have important implications for reproductive rights.163 
Women are both subordinated and manipulated—in other words, deprived
of “equal dignity”—by mandatory ultrasounds.  They are subordinated by 
the inherent paternalism discussed in Part II.C; they are manipulated by 
the compromised informed consent procedure and inherent pro-life bias 
discussed in Part II.B.  While abortion doctrine has always been unique, 
following a pattern different from other lines of substantive due process 
cases, this synthesis of liberty and equality is not entirely foreign to
reproductive rights cases.  Justice Ginsburg has often advised—albeit in 
dissent—that where due process doctrine fails equal protection doctrine 
can offer support.164  The discussion of “equal citizenship” in her Carhart
dissent resonates with and reaffirms notions of “equal dignity.”165  To reiterate
her wise statement, limits on abortion inevitably impact “a woman’s autonomy 
to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”166 
The concept of “equal dignity,” in sum, accurately comprehends the harm
caused by mandatory ultrasounds.
2. Actual Litigation
Plaintiffs have raised many of the arguments discussed above in 
challenging mandatory ultrasound statutes.  Part III.C.2 will examine how 
these arguments have played out in the course of two high-profile cases— 
one challenging the Texas statute, which the Fifth Circuit upheld in 
2012;167 the other challenging the North Carolina statute, which the Fourth
Circuit invalidated in 2014.168  Although these two cases created a circuit 
split, the Supreme Court has thus far declined to resolve it.169  However, 
it seems likely that, in the wake of the 2016 decision of Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt,170 new challenges will be initiated.  The ultimate
outcome for ultrasound mandates is thus, far from clear. 
162. Yoshino, supra note 160, at 148, 179. 
163. Id. at 178–79. 
164. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 171–72. 
166. Id. at 172. 
167. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 584 
(5th Cir. 2012). 
168.  Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 250 (4th Cir. 2014). 
169.  Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838, 2838 (2015). 
170.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). 
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One important point illustrated by the Fourth and Fifth Circuit cases is 
that, where successful, challenges to mandatory ultrasound statutes have 
generally rested on free speech grounds. As previously discussed, although 
free speech doctrine is immensely powerful at present, it may not be the 
ideal means of attacking mandatory ultrasound statutes.  Free speech claims
fail to comprehend the primary harms perpetrated by such statutes, which
are to the dignity and equality of pregnant women rather than to the speech
rights of their doctors.
a. Texas’s Statute 
Texas’s display-and-describe statute, discussed in Part III.B, was challenged
in Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey.171 
Plaintiffs raised several claims, including that it was unconstitutionally
vague, compelled physician speech, compelled patient speech and listening, 
engaged in sex discrimination, unfairly targeted abortion providers, and 
violated patients’ bodily integrity.172  While the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Texas granted a partial preliminary injunction against 
enforcement on vagueness and compelled speech grounds,173 the Fifth 
Circuit reversed.174 
The core of the plaintiffs’ compelled speech argument was that requiring 
doctors to display and describe the ultrasound images and to make the 
fetal heartbeat audible made doctors “mouthpieces” of the state.175  This,
plaintiffs claimed, infringed doctors’ rights “by using them as puppets to 
convey government-mandated speech.”176  The district court found that the 
mandatory nature of the speech distinguished Texas’s statute from that 
upheld in Casey, which only required doctors to “make certain materials
about childbirth and the fetus ‘available’ to the woman[.]”177  Concluding
that the statute did indeed compel doctors to engage in ideological speech— 
“with which they may not agree, regardless of any medical necessity, and
irrespective of whether the pregnant women wish to listen”—the district
court applied strict scrutiny and found that the statute could not survive.178
 171. See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 572–73. 
172. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 
949 (W.D. Tex. 2011). 
173. Id. at 975 (accepting part of the vagueness argument and the entire compelled
speech argument).
174. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 584. 
175. Id. at 579. 
176. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 969.
177. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 579 (emphasis added). 
178. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 975. 
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and deemed the preliminary injunction 
unwarranted.179  After examining existing doctrine with a focus on Casey
and Gonzales, it stated, “[I]nformed consent laws that do not impose an
undue burden on the woman’s right to have an abortion are permissible if 
they require truthful, non-misleading, and relevant disclosures.”180  It defined 
“relevant disclosures” as extending beyond “physical and psychological
risks to the expectant mother” to “the state’s legitimate interests in ‘protecting 
the potential life within her.’”181  It viewed laws that comply with these
principles as “part of the state’s reasonable regulation of medical practice,” 
rather than “compel[led] ‘ideological’ speech that triggers First Amendment 
strict scrutiny.” Ultimately, it held that Texas’s law complied with the 
criteria it had set forth.182  On remand, although the district court implemented 
the Fifth Circuit’s ruling by denying a permanent injunction, the judge
observed that the decision “effectively eviscerated the protections of the
First Amendment in the abortion context.”183  He further commented that
the clear purpose behind Texas’s statute was “to discourage women from 
exercising their constitutional rights by making it more difficult for caring
and competent physicians to perform abortions.”184  The challengers’ request 
for en banc review by the Fifth Circuit was denied.185 
b. North Carolina’s Statute 
North Carolina’s display-and-describe statute, discussed in Part III.B,
was challenged in Stuart v. Camnitz.186  Plaintiffs raised several claims, 
including that it compelled physician speech, was void for vagueness, and 
violated due process guarantees.187  The district court granted a permanent 
injunction against enforcement,188 and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.189
 179. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 584. 
180. Id. at 576. 
181. Id.
 182. Id.
183. Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA­
486-SS, 2012 WL 373132, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012). 
184. Id. at *5. 
185. Texas Medical Providers, et al. v. Lakey, REWIRE, https://rewire.news/legislative­
tracker/legal-case/texas-medical-providers-et-al-v-lakey/ [https://perma.cc/T2V4-ZMMU]
(last visited Jan. 9, 2017). 
186.  Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242, 250 (4th Cir. 2014). 
187.  Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 588 (M.D.N.C. 2014). 
188. Id. at 611. 
189. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 242. 
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Both courts held that the statute compelled physician speech and could 
not survive the requisite level of scrutiny, which was at least intermediate.190 
The challengers asked the courts to apply strict scrutiny because the statute 
compelled ideological speech, but the state urged them to apply only rational 
basis review because the statute regulated the medical profession.191 The
district court ultimately split the difference and applied intermediate scrutiny
because the statute “both compelled speech and regulated the medical
profession.”192 As previously stated, the district court concluded that the
statute could not survive. 
The Fourth Circuit, agreeing that the statute was “a content-based regulation 
of a medical professional’s speech which must satisfy at least intermediate
scrutiny,”193 expressly declined to decide whether such statutes must ever 
satisfy strict scrutiny.194  It noted that, while requiring a doctor to describe
a fetus may not always be viewpoint-based or “ideological,” North Carolina’s 
requirement “explicitly promotes a pro-life message by demanding the 
provision of facts that all fall on one side of the abortion debate—and does 
so shortly before the time of decision when the intended recipient is most
vulnerable.”195  Thus, while the state may certainly require doctors to provide
“information sufficient for patients to give their informed consent to
medical procedures,”196 the Fourth Circuit emphasized that “Casey does
not assert that physicians forfeit their First Amendment rights in the
procedures surrounding abortions.”197  In striking the statute under intermediate 
scrutiny, the Fourth Circuit observed that while the state’s interests in
protecting fetal life, promoting pregnant women’s psychological health, 
and ensuring informed consent were unquestionably “important,”198 the
means the state had deployed were impermissible.199  Although the state
appealed the Fourth Circuit’s decision to the United States Supreme
Court, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.200 
III. MANDATORY ULTRASOUNDS AS “PRECESSION OF SIMULACRA” 
Part III takes a step back from the factual and legal specifics to explore 
the complex relationship between law, fetal images, and women’s realities. 
190. 
191. 
Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 599, 609; Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 245. 
Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 245. 
192. Id.
 193. Id.
 194. Id. at 248. 
195. Id. at 246. 
196. Id. at 247. 
197. Id. at 249. 
198. 
199. 
Id. at 250 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
Id. at 255. 
200.  Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838, 2838 (2015). 
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Part III.A explores the relationship between images and reality and
describes Baudrillard’s work on the “precession of simulacra”—that is,
the postmodern phenomenon of experiencing images more vividly than 
reality.  Part III.B explores how the law interacts with fetal images and
women’s realities in the context of ultrasound mandates.  It argues that such
mandates represent a “precession of simulacra,” in that they encourage 
women to experience fetal images more vividly than they experience the
realities—for example, family dynamics, financial circumstances, and
pre-existing personal and professional responsibilities—that motivated 
their abortion decisions in the first instance.
A. Images, Realities, and the “Precession of Simulacra” 
The disjunction between images and reality has long been a source of 
fascination. It is cleverly portrayed in René Magritte’s 1928–29 painting 
The Treachery of Images, which depicts a pipe underscored by the caption,
“Ceci n’est pas une pipe”—which means, “This is not a pipe.”201  The painting 
is, of course, only the image of a pipe, yet our minds collapse the image
and the actual object such that the caption becomes counterintuitive.  Professor 
Rebecca Tushnet, explaining the import of Magritte’s painting, writes:
We are vulnerable to the treachery of images because we tend to read images
using naïve theories of realism and representation.  Unless we are primed to be
wary of them and regularly reminded to maintain our skepticism, pictures appear
to us to “resemble unmediated reality” more than words do—they seem to be “caused
by the external world without . . . human mediation or authorial interpretation[.]”202 
Our implicit trust of images, in other words, often obscures reality. 
Baudrillard, in his 1981 publication, Simulacra and Simulation, goes 
further than Magritte and observes that, in our postmodern era, images and
reality have developed a far more complex relationship.203  He explains, by
means of a fable by Jorge Luis Borges, how images have come to precede
or supersede reality.204  Borges, in On Exactitude in Science, described an
 201. See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125
HARV. L. REV. 683, 689 (2012) (discussing the painting) (citing René Magritte, The Treachery 
of Images (1929), reproduced at https://collections.lacma.org/node/239578 [https://perma.
cc/2EKR-629A] (last visited Jan. 9, 2017)).
202. Tushnet, supra note 201 (“‘The caption is both true and false: this is not a pipe 
(it is a picture of a pipe)[.]’”). 
203. See generally BAUDRILLARD, supra note 1. 
204. Id. at 1. 
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empire whose cartographers had created a map so detailed that it was the
same size as the empire itself.205  According to Baudrillard, “the territory
no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it[;] the map [instead]
precedes the territory [and, indeed,] engenders the territory[.]”206 This
phenomenon, of images preceding or superseding reality, is what Baudrillard
refers to as the “precession of simulacra.”207  Whereas images once represented 
reality, they now create “a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal.”208 
In other words, we now inhabit a world in which images have become
more real than reality, and in which the difference between “the ‘real’ and 
the ‘imaginary’” has been deeply destabilized, if not entirely destroyed.209 
Baudrillard further explains, in The Evil Demon of Images and the
Precession of Simulacra, that “our world . . . is caught up in a mad pursuit 
of images [that paradoxically] describe the equal impossibility of the real
and of the imaginary.”210  Baudrillard writes that media images fascinate
us “not because they are sites of the production of meaning and representation[, 
but] because they are sites of the disappearance of meaning and
representation, . . . in which we are caught quite apart from any judgment
of reality, thus sites of a fatal strategy of denegation of the real and of the 
reality principle.”211  While we historically thought that “a sign could refer
to the depth of meaning,” signs have today become “uninterrupted circuit[s]
without reference or circumference.”212  In postmodernity, we can no longer 
“isolate [either] the process of simulation [or] the process of the real[.]”213 
Even “power . . . eventually break[s] apart . . . and becom[es] a simulation 
of power.”214  According to Baudrillard, our postmodern world is predominantly 
populated by images and simulations.215  And although Baudrillard focused 
primarily on media images, his ideas can be extended to other types of
images, including those produced with ultrasound technology.
 205. See JORGE LUIS BORGES, COLLECTED FICTIONS 325 (Andrew Hurley trans., 
Penguin Group 1999). 
Facebook and other social media sites where people carefully construct and regulate online 
206. 
207. 
BAUDRILLARD, supra note 1, at 1.
Id.
 208. Id.
 209. Id. at 3.  Had Baudrillard lived to the present day, he might have pointed to 
identities as examples of images superseding reality. 
210. Baudrillard, The Evil Demon of Images, supra note 1.
 211. Id.
 212. Id. at 196. The former is representation, the latter is simulation.  See id.
 213. Id. at 198. 
214. Id.
 215. See id. at 194. 
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B. Mandatory Ultrasounds, Fetal Images, and Women’s Realities 
Mandatory ultrasounds elevate fetal imagery over women’s lived experiences 
in an effort to manipulate decision-making and achieve pro-life results. 
Given that we tend to privilege image-based information over other forms 
of information, one can understand their immense power.  Professor 
Zechmeister, in her work on ultrasound imagery—discussed above in Part
II.A—writes, “Seeing has become the most important of our senses,” such 
that “information obtained through seeing . . . is regarded as more likely
to be true than information obtained with all other senses.”216  This,  of  
course, makes ultrasounds particularly powerful and potentially manipulative. 
As Professor Clare Huntington has argued, mandatory ultrasounds are 
meant to evoke emotions of “motherhood,” because “mothers love their
children and would never harm them,”217 as well as emotions of “guilt”
and “shame,” because only a bad person would consider abortion.218  A
woman who chooses abortion but then views a sonogram, the state hopes, 
will “feel[] guilty for rejecting motherhood.”219  She will come to understand 
the fetus as a “human being,” and the abortion as “a shameful act no loving 
person would undertake.”220  Professor Huntington criticizes this legislative
tactic for “privileging and emphasizing one set of emotions over another” 
and “manipulating the emotional context of decision making.”221  Another
way of phrasing her argument is to say that the state should not deploy
ultrasound images in an effort to evoke emotions that will override the 
realities that lead to abortion.  It bears emphasizing that the women subject 
to ultrasound mandates have already made their decisions and are being
asked to rethink them.222  As Professor Carol Sanger has written, mandatory 
ultrasounds are “meant to bend a woman’s will once she has already made 
up her mind to seek an abortion.”223 
While some would argue that the law should encourage women to give
careful thought to their abortion decisions, there is no indication either 
that women do not already give careful thought to their abortion decisions 
216.  Zechmeister, supra note 29, at 392. 
217.  Huntington, supra note 11, at 1134. 
218.  Id. at 1134–36. 
219.  Id. at 1134. 
220.  Id. at 1136. 
221.  Id. 
222.  See id. at 1135. 
223. Sanger, supra note 15, at 362 (emphasis added). 






















   
 
 
    




    
   
  
  
   
 
or that ultrasound mandates actually encourage careful thought.224  On the
first point, when women seeking abortions speak about their motivations, 
they typically cite concerns about their financial situations and the high
cost of child-rearing; conflicts with work, school, or pre-existing caregiving 
responsibilities—or some combination of those things; and family dynamics.225 
These and other personal factors, including women’s own emotions, 
represent reality and should, accordingly, drive the abortion decision.  On
the second point, as Professor Huntington points out, “mandatory sonogram 
laws may have little practical effect on a woman’s decision to have an
abortion.”226  It is again important to emphasize that women subject to 
these laws have already chosen abortion.  Thus, Professor Huntington argues,
the laws’ primary effects may not be to alter their choices but rather to enforce 
social norms that “fetus[es are] human being[s],” “pregnant women are 
mothers,” and “abortion[s are] shameful.”227 
When state legislatures force a pregnant woman to view a sonogram, 
they exploit fetal images in an attempt to produce an imagined, fully-
formed “person.”  Yet in reality, most fetuses cannot survive outside of the
uterus until close to twenty-four weeks of gestation—even with the best
available medical interventions.228  Given that a mere 1.3% of abortions
occur after twenty-one weeks of gestation,229 the vast majority of legally 
mandated ultrasounds do not depict anything close to a fully formed “person.” 
Yet they do disrespect and deny the realities of the pregnant woman’s life 
that motivated her to choose abortion, and this privileging of images over 
reality is problematic. 
224. See Huntington, supra note 11, at 1106. 
225. Fact Sheet: Induced Abortion in the United States, supra note 20 (“The three 
most common reasons [patients gave for choosing abortion]—each cited by three-fourths 
of patients—were concern for or responsibility to other individuals; the inability to afford 
a child; and the belief that having a baby would interfere with work, school or the ability
to care for dependents. Half said they did not want to be a single parent or were having
problems with their husband or partner.”). 
226. Huntington, supra note 11, at 1135. 
227. Id. at 1136. 
228. Kenneth J. Ryan, Tissue Transplantation from Aborted Fetuses, Organ Transplantation
from Anencephalic Infants and Keeping Brain-Dead Pregnant Women Alive Until Fetal 
Viability, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 692 (1991) (“A fetus of less than twenty-four weeks of
age and six hundred grams of weight is very unlikely to survive outside of the uterus.
Below this age, development of the fetal lung, skin, kidney, and other organs is insufficient 
to allow sustained extrauterine life, even with the most advanced medical attention. . . .
Merely achieving the viability age of twenty-four weeks is however a minimalist goal 
because every additional week in utero increases chances for survival and greater neurological
integrity.”).  More recently, some have placed viability at twenty-two weeks, though at
that point there is “a high risk of disability and impairment.”  John A. Robertson, Abortion 
and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain, Viability, and Early Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 327, 337 (2011). 
229. Fact Sheet: Induced Abortion in the United States, supra note 20. 
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IV. CONCLUSION
While the law’s proper role in society is of course contested, this Article 
argues that mandatory ultrasounds should not, by privileging images over
reality, force us into what Baudrillard referred to as “hyperreality.”
Legislatures, that is, should not require that women view emotionally 
evocative ultrasound images in an attempt to override the realities that led 
to their abortion decisions.  The law should respect and—in the words of 
slain abortion provider George Tiller—“trust women”230 to make their
own decisions based on their own lived experiences.  While ultrasound 
technology has many valid, and indeed invaluable, medical applications 
in the context of pregnancy and abortion, laws that require a provider to
perform, or a patient to view, ultrasound images do not support these valid 
medical applications.  To be clear: This Article does not argue that medical 
professionals should not perform, or that pregnant women should not view, 
ultrasounds prior to abortions, but rather that the law should not be involved 
in the decision whether to perform or view an ultrasound.  Beyond ensuring 
the pregnant woman’s informed consent, the law should not intervene. 
This Article contends that the legal argument that best comprehends the
harm inflicted by mandatory ultrasounds—the harm of elevating fetal 
images over women’s realities—is an “equal dignity” argument.  Such an 
argument captures both the paternalistic stereotyping and the deprivation 
of autonomous decision-making that mandatory ultrasounds entail.  While 
free speech claims have been effective litigation tools, “equal dignity” 
claims are uniquely capable of rejecting legislatively imagined “personhood”
and respecting women’s lived experiences.
 230. Jessica Valenti, What Would George Tiller Do?, THE NATION (May 31, 2012)
http://www.thenation.com/blog/168157/what-would-george-tiller-do [https://perma.cc/ 
3LR2-KSTJ] (noting that Tiller often wore a button that said “Trust Women”). 
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